

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Intelligence Division

ACofS, G-2

\*Army and State dept.  
reviews completed\*

26 June 1951

\*9 Feb 81

006514

THE MALIK STATEMENT

The well-publicized "armistice" statement recently made by Jacob A. Malik, Soviet Chief Delegate to the United Nations, is not an indication of change in Soviet foreign policy objectives. It represents a subtle continuation of efforts to attain the current major objective of averting or delaying Western defensive preparations and weakening Western determination to resist Communist aggression.

Malik devoted the greater part of his statement to familiar diatribes against the United States and Western European cooperation for defense. Western foreign policy was characterized as "profoundly vicious", with specific criticism of the following: (1) Conclusion of NATO (allegedly a military alliance directed against the Soviet orbit); (2) establishment of United States military bases abroad; (3) remilitarization of Western Germany and the creation of West German armed forces; (4) revival of Japanese militarism; (5) the "mad armaments race" and the expansion of NATO armed forces, especially those of the United States; (6) "illegal" United Nations intervention in Korea; (7) "seizure" of Formosa and bombing of Chinese territory - these indicating a United States endeavor to extend the war in the Far East; (8) United Nations branding of Communist China as an aggressor and the "illegal" embargo against China; and (9) delay of Communist China's representation in the United Nations.

Thus, the statement's emphatic criticism of Western policies included all the issues raised in previous discussions. It was unnecessary to include the specific conditions previously demanded as essential to a "peaceful" Korean settlement: (1) Chinese Communist participation in the discussions; (2) withdrawal of "foreign troops" from Korea; and (3) cessation of United States "occupation" of Formosa. These conditions were implied in the body of the statement and almost certainly would be raised, in typical Soviet manner, as stumbling blocks early in discussions.

The Korean cease-fire proposal was expressed in the brief concluding remarks, phrased in alluring noncontroversial terms, which Malik characteristically failed to clarify. This technique indicates that the Soviets raised the cease-fire issue at this time merely as another tactic in pursuance of their current general objective to weaken Western resistance to Communist expansion, and specifically to forestall the presently unfavorable course of Communist military developments in Korea. The statement thus may have been designed to open negotiations and discussions to gain time to allow an improvement in the Communists' military position in Korea and to permit

**CONFIDENTIAL**

## **CONFIDENTIAL**

the unhampered completion of organization, training, and equipment of Chinese Communist forces not yet committed to action. This tactic is not a new one, and indeed was used by the Chinese Communists themselves in 1946. On that occasion they gained a very real advantage by the simple device of determined and repetitive violation of the terms of the cease-fire. Nationalist Chinese strongly suspected violation, but inspection teams were frustrated in their efforts to determine the facts of troop movement and other military preparation---yet the Nationalists could not bring themselves to the decision to abrogate the cease-fire, even in view of Communist cupidity and bad faith.

Finally, the proposal for discussions is a continuation of the tactics employed in calling for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) on the German question and also on a Japanese Peace Treaty. All these previous proposals were clearly intended to cause delay, indecision, and dissension over the Western military preparedness program.

The main factors affecting the timing of the Malik proposal appear to be: (1) The course of military events in Korea, currently unfavorable to the Communists; (2) the propaganda opportunity presented by the anniversary of the Korean War; and (3) the break-up of the Paris CFM agenda conference and the Soviet desire to create a basis for further "peace" discussions calculated to delay Western programs. Also possibly contributing to the timing may have been the desire to disrupt President Truman's address scheduled for 25 June, and to take advantage of the absence of United Nations Secretary General Trygve Lie, who is vacationing in Oslo and is out of immediate touch with rapidly developing situations.

For the last two years, Soviet propaganda has been devoted primarily to the "Peace Campaign", in which the U. S. S. R. has been portrayed as the principal proponent for the "preservation of peace", in contrast to Western "aggressive intentions". The Malik statement is another gambit in this campaign to retain the initiative in "peace" discussions. In this latest propaganda move the Soviets undoubtedly expected a favorable reaction, which has already appeared, from the wide sectors of world opinion which hope that a peaceful settlement with the Communists can be achieved without the effort, expense, and risks of military preparedness and determined action. This latest expression of Soviet "peace" propaganda is alluring and promises to affect large groups in both Western Europe and the United States. Its undoubted purpose is to cause a relaxation in the Western preparedness program.

## **CONFIDENTIAL**

## **CONFIDENTIAL**

The Soviets may well consider that a temporary cessation of the Korean War would be an inexpensive means to attain their other major objectives, including a planned development of the Chinese Communist Armed Forces. They might thus conceivably put off some of their previous basic demands to obtain a cease-fire. Feigned concessions in Korea would be advantageous to the Communists now because: (1) The Korean economy is virtually destroyed; (2) Communist agents undoubtedly have established their networks in Korean areas under United Nations control; (3) responsibility for any resumption of hostilities could be placed on non-Communist forces; and (4) time will aid the Communists to build up their strength safely, inside and outside Korea.

In summary, the Malik statement does not represent any change in Soviet Far Eastern and global objectives, but rather is an extension of the familiar tactic of proposing negotiations when direct Communist action has failed. Briefly, the Communists have "nothing to lose and everything to gain" by making such a proposal, and by "negotiations" if their proposal is accepted.

**CONFIDENTIAL**